Back in January 2015 the Hoegh Osaka suffered from loss of stability and ended up grounded on a sandbank in Southampton Water. The MAIB (Marine Accident Investigation Branch) suggested that the company rationalise its checklists which at the time of the accident contained 213 tick boxes, all of them ticked by the chief officer. But this event and others indicate that just ticking boxes is not going to do the job. In many ways it is just a means of blaming the crew for anything that might go wrong.  

An overside discharge causing trouble.

Those who read accident reports might also remember the fatality which occurred on the Skandi Pacific offshore Australia. During the securing of the backload a large wave swept up the deck of the ship pushing a number of cargo items ahead of it. This resulted in one of the deck crew being crushed between a container and a skip. Prior to the ship going alongside a semi-submersible to back load cargo, the master, in accordance with the company safety management manual, had carried out a toolbox talk with the mate, the second mate and the two crew members who were to be working on deck. At 0200 at the change of watch the crew member who was going on watch came to the bridge, received his toolbox talk and “signed the briefing form”.  He then went to the deck and took over from the man who was to be relieved. But the vessel was shipping seas aft, and so work with the rig ceased, and it was during the securing of the cargo that the casualty occurred. So what good was the toolbox talk and what was effectively a checklist requiring the crewmembers signatures? It turns out that the crew had become accustomed to waves sweeping up the deck and, one assumes, they were therefore familiar with cargo shifting about. It was just bad luck that one of the them was trapped within the lashing system. The Skandi Pacific safety management system contained risk assessments which included details of the tasks, the people involved, the identified risks and the control measures, and apparently these risk assessments were discussed at the toolbox talks, and the company apparently promoted a “stop the job” culture. The SMS also contained a management of change process. But none of this prevented the man from being killed. So what good was the signature checklist? 

What can be taken away from these accidents and, where appropriate, their subsequent investigations? Even after the crew of the Skandi Pacific had carried out everything that the company required of it in terms of risk assessments and toolbox talks, there was still the worst possible outcome from what was supposed to be a routine activity. In some respects it could be that the DP system was to blame, since it allowed the second mate to step the ship away from the rig but to maintain the heading at the second position, and it was stern to the sea. Had the ship not been capable of DP operations then there is no doubt that it would have been allowed to drift downwind, automatically reducing the possibility of seas coming aboard, and even stern to the weather it was just a matter of getting the draught and trim right in the moderate sea condition prevailing at the time. Could a checklist ever deal with this particular situation? 

So the lesson is that it is not possible to create a checklist which covers all possible situations, nor is it actually possible to create one without associated guidance, but actually in the complex world in which offshore vessels operate they can be a help, and one which is properly developed will also serve to ensure that not only is the ship prepared for the task to be undertaken, the offshore installation will also be ready, and will be aware of any limitations. 

Typically when the ship is preparing for departure, back in the old days the third mate went to the bridge and tested the whistle and the engine room telegraph, and got out the movement book. How would this be carried out today? Obviously some things were missed even then. It is necessary to be aware that the ship is stable and that all the crew are on board, and one would want to know this if there were contractors on board, so a report from the contractor manager would be required. Then it would be necessary to know that all the propulsion and manoeuvring systems were operational. How would this requirement be presented? Would individual systems be detailed on the checklist – main engines, thrusters, rudders at all control stations? Clearance to depart would be required, and a passage plan even from the berth to the fairway buoy be available, since much seems to go wrong during departures. 

So what can be done? What follows might possibly be considered to be a checklist about checklists. 

At some point it has to be determined whether the checklists are intended solely for the ship, as an aide memoire or intended to create a record which can be used in evidence later, either to protect the ship from blame for anything which might go wrong at an installation, or to protect the management of the ship. In either case the name of the ship the date and the facility name should be included. 

There is considerable concentration in the offshore industry on what happens at the periphery of the 500 metre safety zone surrounding all offshore installations in most places in the world. If the ship has arrived safely at it and is intended to carry out tasks alongside the installation, there could be many questions asked, some of which might require answers from the installation. They should feature weather, work, cranes, timing etc. The checklist can be used, if properly constructed, to alert the installation to what it itself has to do. 

In very simple terms there should be a limited number of tick boxes. Twenty questions/statements might be an apropriate total number, and if there are more than that maybe it is time to review them, discard some and combine others. It is also possible to have a main checklist and then associate this list with a secondary list. And however it is done there should be an assignment of importance. 

So there would be checks to be carried out between the ship and the installlation, checks to be carried out between the master and the workforce who are to go out in the deck, and then checks to be carried out effectively between the bridge and the engine room. Some, or all of the checklist should result in a further checklist, which might deal with deck cargo operations, bulk liquid transfer and anchor-handling. Or on the other hand there might be a separate checklists for each type of operation,  

In order to provide examples of how checklists could be constructed, and thereafter how they might be used some examples follow: 

On the basis of the fact that the ship has arrived at the edge of the 500 metre zone surrounding a platform and is carrying out its checks, one of the perennial problems has been the overside discharges which can, on windy days, cause problems for visibility at control position on the bridge and deluge the crew working on deck, and since the content of the discharges is unknown, possibly cause health problems. Hence in the G-OMO 500 metre checklist the problem is sort of addressed: 

 This table is not associated with any guidance so either the “Yes” box or the “No” box can be ticked, and if the Yes box is ticked there is no knowing what conversation has passed between the installation and the ship, so if in fact the discharges are going to be a problem would a comment be added and the job allowed to continue. Probably yes, because despite the problems these discharges cause for the ships alongside, to shut them off might well stop the job. So what would the comment be? It is possible to think of some which would fit into the limited space.

 If the checklist was intended to be completed positively before the ship made its way across the 500 metre safety zone the phrasing might be as follows:

No 13 Guidance. If no possibility of discharges being minimised special PPE to be issued to the deck crew and risk assessment to be undertaken involving the OIM of the installation and the master of the ship. 

It is also possible to develop a checklist which requires the assignment of activities, so that everyone who has to do something becomes involved. Typically for instance the passage plan in the departure checklist would be carried out by the second mate. In the case of No 13 the table might look as follows: 

In this case there are no options. Either the Control Room confirms that the overside discharges have been minimised or the job does not take place, and similarly all the other boxes would have to be ticked. Just incidentally it is best to combine all the information within the checklist. It just requires a bit of ingenuity with the compilation of the table. This avoids the possibility of bits of the required information being lost during printing, if that is what is to be done. 

In general it may be easier to ask questions which allow for a yes or no answer with guidance as might be required. For instance one might ask whether the weather conditions are going to be suitable for the task which is to be carried out, and whether the OIM of the installation agrees with the estimation of the condition. Obviously if the answer to this question was “No” either as far as the ship is concerned, or the installation, this would be sufficient for the work to be postponed, 

Currently the G-OMO checklists differentiate between DP and non DP ships, which may also be appropriate and in the case of some tasks, it might be best to access the IMCA site for their checklists. The UK “Step Change in Safety” website has checklists available including a “Manual Handling Workplace Checklist”.

So, checklists can be made to work for you, but it may be best to have your own. In the complex world of safety communications between the client, the oil company, the shipping company and sometimes the middle man, the oil rig owner, many discussions take place on a regular basis to ensure that everything is safe. But probably everyone is just using a checklist, ticking things off as they are mentioned. So why not come to a collective agreement about checklists which will work, making everybody responsible for the success of the operation. So something to put on the checklist – make sure the checklists appropriate?