The other day (August 15th 2023) the drilling barge Majestic capsized in a creek in Nigeria while being moved from one place to another. Four of the 96 people on board at the time were lost. The Nigerian authorities say that an investigation is to take place, and up to now have said that the unit had been working in Nigeria since 2016 without the required approvals. Since it is unlikely that we will ever see the results of any investigation there follows my report on the loss of the Mr K a drilling barge engaged in similar shallow water work in April 1957.
This is a photo of the unfortunate Majestic.
On April 17th 1957 the drilling barge Mr K capsized while under tow close to the entrance to South Pass in the Gulf of Mexico. Of the crew of 15 men, nine lost their lives and three were injured. The barge was extensively damaged. The event was investigated by the US Coast Guard and their report published on April 22nd 1957.
THE VESSELS INVOLVED.
The drilling barge Mr K was according to the report “an uninspected mobile drilling platform”. The unit consisted of a hull on which were mounted a number of columns, which were topped by a deck which supported the drilling derrick, the accommodation, the helideck and a storage area for tubulars and chemicals, and within which was storage for mud, the pumping systems and the generators. It had been designed and built by the Bethlehem Steel Company, in 1956, for drilling in water depths not exceeding 14 feet (4.25 metres). The unit was 164 feet (50 metres) long and 54 feet (16.5 metres) wide. Ballast tanks in the lower hull allowed it to be floated, and sunk to rest on the seabed. There were also tanks in the hull for fuel, ballast and fresh water. The derrick was located at the stern and below it in the lower hull was a slot which allowed drilling to take place. It was owned and operated by Golden Meadow Well Service Company.
There were two tugs employed to move the rig from its location. The first, the Itco II was a 63 foot (19.2 metres) diesel tug built in 1956 and owned by the Independent Towing company the second, the Madeline was an almost identical vessel owned by Franklin Towing Company and chartered by Otto Candies. Neither of the tug masters were formally qualified and they had limited experience of towing drilling barges in the open sea.
PREAMBLE
On April 15th the barge was positioned on a prepared bed of sea shells in order to carry out drilling activities. The derrick was raised in its operational position and the barge was loaded with tubulars and equipment for its forthcoming drilling programme. The liquids in tanks were estimated at being between one foot and three feet (less than one metre), with the fuel tank being two thirds full. The fresh water tanks which contained about three feet (one metre) of water were interconnected by open valves. The estimates of the volumes in the tanks were based on the times when the pumps lost suction. Although the barge was provided with sounding pipes, no soundings were taken, or actually had ever been taken.
The report says that the barge was “continuously occupied in the accommodation there-on”, and that there were five people sleeping at the time of the casualty. This remark reflects the situation in the gulf at the time, when the drilling facilities were in general close inshore and that many were not actually provided with living accommodation. Although there was some disagreement amongst the survivors, the report accepted that there were 20 lifejackets, three life floats and a number of lifebuoys on board. The rig was not provided with a general alarm system or a Station Bill.
On April 16th adverse weather caused deformation of the foundation and therefore the charterers, the Humble Oil Company, decided that the barge should be moved to Joseph’s Bayou while this was rebuilt.
THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.
April 17th 1957.
0700. De-ballasting of the barge commences. One assumes that at this time the two tugs are attached one on the port bow and one on the starboard bow.
0900. The barge is afloat with a draught of six feet (two metres). The derrick is in the raised position, even though the facility is available for it to be lowered.
0938. The tugs and the tow are making way at about three knots. Winds southeasterly at 10 knots, and a three foot swell. The barge starts to list to port.
0940. The barge capsizes and remains afloat, bottom up.
Subsequent to the capsize US Coast Guard aircraft and vessels searched for survivors. These included one fixed wing aircraft, two helicopters and two patrol boats. Although the investigation does not say precisely how those who survived were rescued, or how the bodies of those who died were recovered, some detail of the manner in which the upturned barge was returned to port is included, but is unimportant to this narrative.
THE INVESTIGATION.
The investigators did not have a problem in determining the cause of the accident, which was loss of stability. The combination of a greater than usual deck load, the fact that the derrick was in the operational rather than stowed position, and the slack tanks in the lower hull was sufficient, they thought, to cause the capsize.
Since the barge had been moved several times before successfully, it appeared that the problem had been operational, and as the report says, approvals and inspections during construction will not eliminate operational errors stemming from a lack of knowledge of stability. The investigators suggested that there were particular problems during the time when the unit was being ballasted up or down, and that the barge had been designed for inland waters rather than for the unprotected seas of the Gulf of Mexico. They also determined that possibly the tug masters were under-experienced, and unqualified particularly since they had displayed a lack of knowledge of “piloting” and the use of the nautical chart.
It also became apparently during the investigation that the supervisory personnel on board the Mr K were primarily experienced in drilling, and that none were aware of the dangers relating to ballasting, de-ballasting and the operation of the vessel in open waters.
By then the industry and the regulatory bodies involved in the offshore business were studying these particular difficulties, and they suggested that any procedures and systems under development should be considered to be experimental. In fact, as a result of the studies a special committee representing the industry drafted a document called “Manual for Safe Operating Practices for Offshore Mobile Drilling Platforms”. This was distributed in the industry for additional study and comment. This document when complete would contain guidance on stability, ballasting, de-ballasting, special hurricane procedures, manning, qualifications, supervision and responsibilities.
The investigators made a number of recommendations, initially in the short term pending improvements in the regulations and guidance, that none, or a very limited number of personnel should be on board these barges during tows, that the derrick should be lowered to the horizontal position at all times when under way and that a person with marine engineering experience and a practical knowledge of stability be required to be in charge of mobile platforms when preparing for and moving from one location to another.
More formally they recommended that mobile platforms at sea, but less than three miles from the coast should be subject to the same regulations as were in place for platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf, and that those regulations should be amended to include the approval of plans stability tests and inspections during construction.
COMMENT
This drilling barge appears to have been similar in design to the “Mr Charlie” which had entered service only two years previously, and incidentally caused the design, building and operation of the first offshore supply vessel, the Ebb Tide which had entered service in the same year.
The cause of the accident was precisely as determined by the investigation, and while the findings are obvious, and any mariner would probably be able to asses the likely progress of the event just by standing on the deck, those operating the craft obviously found it difficult to grasp that the activity in which they were engaged was in the sea, and that the marine environment possibly held more risks for them than those inherent in the drilling business. As readers will see as the narrative progresses, nothing much was going to change as times passed.
You will note that the Coast Guard recommended that the number of personnel on a drilling marge should be limited during rig moves. There were 96 people on the Majestic.