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People who have followed Shell’s distressing exploration experience in the Arctic, which resulted finally in the grounding the semi-submersible Kulluk during its tow from Alaska to Seattle in 2012, and subsequently its departure to the breakers on a heavy lift ship (See my book “A Catalogue of Disasters”), might not realise that the rig had been part of the Beaudrill fleet originally constructed in 1979 to carry out exploration drilling in the Canadian Beaufort Sea. The company, which was based in Calgary, also built a mobile caisson, the Molipaq, capable, according to the specification for the unit of being able to accept ice loads of 100,000 tons. They also built four icebreaking support vessels to tow and supply these rigs. Two were massive, very powerful and even for those of us who have become used to the unusual shapes of supply vessels, very unattractive. The other two, the Ikaluk and the Miscaroo, were designed by Robert Allen, more or less taking into account what a good looking anchor-handler should be like, while catering for the extremes of climate and the need to conform with the Canadian Coast Guard requirement for “Arctic Class 4” vessels. They were 79 metres long and were powered by four engines giving 15,000 bhp with the relevant levels of bollard pull. The Ikaluk was built at Nippon Kokan in Japan and the Miscaroo at Vancouver Shipyards. By the 1983 standards, even though they were not as large as the German and Milne designs, they were still as large as, and as powerful as, anything else available at the time. They were, according to the specification, capable of travelling continuously through ice 1.2 metres thick at three knots, the double drum winch was totally enclosed and could be viewed from the bridge on CCTV and the bowthruster was designed to avoid being clogged up with ice, the intake being positioned under the hull. After the failure of the Arctic drilling activity the Ikaluk was briefly seen in Aberdeen, which exposed it to two design failings, one was the fact that the deck was not wood sheathed, and therefore the cargo tended to move about as the ship rolled, and the other was the very high fuel consumption which put off potential charterers. But fortunately for their continued employment, offshore oilfields were being developed at Sakhalin and so the two ships migrated there, as did the Molipaq, and incidentally one of the larger ships, the Kalvik. At the time of writing both the Miscaroo, now the Smit Sakhalin, and the Ikaluk which has been the Smit Sibu but is now the Ikaluk again, are both working in support of the offshore oil and gas fields at Sakhalin.
The Miscaroo, as the Smit Sakhalin in the Russian ice. Photo Alexander Fedoseev
THE NOBLE PAUL ROMERO EVENT
The rig on the deck of the submersible Dockwise Vanguard. Photo Gaetano Spiteri.
Apart from a fairly vague report in the Malta press we know nothing about what happened to the Noble Paul Romero earlier this month. It was lying alongside undergoing maintenance when it began to sink, and all hands were evacuated. The newspaper had obtained a photo of a whole bunch of people in hard hats sitting on the quayside. It seems likely that there were apertures into the rig open to the sea and that it kept taking on water until the rig was settled on the bottom and the water inside was level with the water outside. It seems probable that, at the very least, sensitive systems were damaged by immersion in seawater.
There-after it appears that the rig was refloated in some way and mated with the brand new Dockwise Vanguard which then returned to the harbour with the rig on the deck. It now appears that rather than taking the rig somewhere, the ship which is the latest and greatest in the Dockwise fleet and could be a contender for the position of most unusual ship afloat, is being used as a drydock to allow repairs to be carried out. This is not a bad plan if one thinks about it, since the rig was already under repair it is reasonable to assume that there is a sufficient level of expertise on the island to do what-ever is required to return it to service.
The Noble Paul Romero is an interesting unit, originally being a submersible, intended to rest on the seabed in extremely shallow water, and now modified to be capable of anchoring in about 5000 metres of water. This photo shows the original and new structure very clearly.
INCIDENTS ON DP DRILL SHIPS
The US Coastguard recently issued a safety alert concerning the loss of position and subsequent emergency disconnect on DP drill ships in the Gulf. One of them was the result of adverse weather, causing the ship to lose station. The possibility of thunderstorms with high winds had been forecast well before the incident but despite this no preparations were made. As a result when the storm hit only half the available generators were on line, so that when the DPO ordered a large heading change with a high rate of turn the ship was unable to respond. In other incidents when the crew were attempting to put a repaired thruster back on line, rather than this happening the electrical disturbance resulted in the failure of all thrusters. The only possible action then was EDS.
A SUPERYACHT INCIDENT
The Jemasa. Hkvoort - the builders Photo
You could hardly make it up, but never-the-less the Telegraph recently reported on a fatal accident which occurred to the Jesama in Phuket, Thailand.
Like many vessels the Jesama was provide with docking stations on the wings of the bridge, which could be deselected, probably from the main console in the wheelhouse. However, in order to close the cover on the docking stations it was necessary to put the main engine controls to full ahead. From this point it would be unnecessary to go on, but I will.
A crew member was tidying up on the wing of the bridge, and assumed after eye contact with the master that the console had been disconnected. The blue light, which he thought provided confirmation, was out. However actually the light which indicated that the console was live was yellow, and difficult to see in bright sunlight.
The crew member put the engine controls to full ahead to close the console and the ship took off at high speed. Despite the fact that the master immediately cancelled the order, three of the mooring lines parted and two people standing on the quayside were hit by flying debris. One, a sixteen year old girl, died of her injuries five days later in hospital.
The accident was investigated by the Maritime Authority of the Caymen Islands, where the yacht was registered, and they made a number of recommendations to reduce the possibility of similar events in the future.
It is sad that a life was lost due to a completely loony installation, which could have been made safe in a number of ways.
LIFEBOATS ON OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
Freefall lifeboats on the Elgin Platform. Photo Victor Gibson
In an industry which is fixated with acronyms, lifeboats have not escaped, and since the most commonly installed are totally enclosed, to cope with the possibility of fire on the sea surface they are known as “TEMPSC” (Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft), although in this article they will continue to be called “lifeboats”, because, let’s face it, that’s what they are. In addition to the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 the siting and operation of these craft have been influenced by the loss of the Alexander Keilland in Norwegian waters in 1980 and the Ocean Ranger offshore Canada in 1982.
In all cases the existing lifeboat systems were found wanting. On the Alexander Keilland four of the lifeboats were lowered to the water without problems, but in the extremely rough seas prevailing at the time, the crews found it impossible to release the falls, and as a result the boats were thrown against the rig structure and suffered damage. The Ocean Ranger capsized in hurricane force winds off the coast of Newfoundland, with the loss of the lives of all 82 personnel on board. Although there were no witnesses to the evacuation efforts on the rig, one of the boats got away but was seen to be damaged during the time that efforts were being made to recover the survivors to the Seaforth Highlander. Unfortunately before anyone could be rescued the boat capsized and everyone was lost in the freezing water. At Piper Alpha no boats got away. Almost as soon the accident occurred the communications were destroyed, and so no formal evacuation processes were put in place, however a number of recommendations regarding evacuation means were made by the court of enquiry.
The failure of the survivors to release the boats from the falls on the Alexander Keilland has resulted in the almost universal adoption of on load release gear. The related IMO resolution requires the designers to put in place some sort of safety system which will ensure that the boats are actually in the water before release can take place, but as all readers of this article will know, the inadvertent release of one or both ends of lifeboats while still in the stowed position, or on the way down, has resulted in many accidents and a number of fatalities.
In Canada the authorities have concentrated on the means of ensuring that the boats, if used, will not be set back against the structure and as a result the “PROD” (Preferred Orientation and Displacement System) is an essential component of all lifeboat systems there. The PROD system consists of a very long fibreglass pole from the end of which a wire is attached to the bow of the related boat. When the boat is stowed the prod is vertical and as the boat is lowered the prod takes up a horizontal position and bends as the boat enters the water. When the falls are released the boat is pulled away from the installation.
The on-load release gear continues to create problems, the only real solution to which seems to be to improve training. The SOLAS regulations require that the capacity of lifeboats be determined using a weight per seafarer of 75 kilos, but the HSE in UK carried out a study which determined that the average weight of an offshore worker was in fact 89 kilos. In the Gulf of Mexico the average weight of an offshore worker may be as much as 95 kilos. Also in UK, the regulations require that there be sufficient boats for 150% of the personnel on board, and in Norway capacity for 200% is required. While this has not resulted in problems for many production platforms, which have, over the years, shed personnel, the change has created difficulties for the operators of mobile units They have seen their numbers on board rise steadily as more and more specialists are employed, and as limitations on working hours have been implemented. These factors have resulted in the installation of higher capacity lifeboats. Of course we should note that because of the possible dangers from accidental release, boats are never filled, so no-one actually knows whether the personnel assigned to a particular boat will fit in it.
Probably the only other major change in recent years has been the introduction of the free fall lifeboat. The first lifeboat of this type was installed on a ship in 1961, but it was not until the 1990s that the system achieved widespread use in the offshore industry. The free fall boat overcomes two of the challenges to successful evacuation, the first is the possible set-back caused in adverse weather and which devices such as the PROD are intended to overcome, and the second is the limited capability of the coxswains.
People outwith the oil industry may be surprised to learn that lifeboat coxswains on offshore installations are very unlikely to have any marine qualifications or even a marine background. In the UK they will have been on a course which has a total duration of 29 hours, although OPITO (the Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation) the developers of the course requirements, would suggest that this is only a starting point, and that the course should be supported by constant training and exercise. But then one would have to ask how this could be achieved if there is such a lack of confidence in the means of deployment, and of course in some seas of the world, if there was very little likelihood that the boat could be safely recovered.
Of course, the disasters already mentioned have resulted in many improvements to the safety of offshore installations which will limit the possibility that evacuation will be necessary. And in any case there are helicopters, and the means of personnel transfer to support vessels, which would probably be used before anyone even thought about getting in the boats. So, finally, should it be assumed that the SOLAS regulations are adequate, and that the coxswains despite their limited training, will manage in the very, very unlikely event that the boats would have to be used, or should the industry continue to search for a better means of evacuation, regardless of the likely cost? Even though formal risk assessment techniques now indicate that may be pointless to provide offshore installations with lifeboats, or in fact any means of waterborne evacuation, the answer to both parts of the question would appear to be “yes”.
THE HERCULES 265
More from the Gulf of Mexico. The Hercules 265 was involved in work on a gas well 55 miles offshore Louisiana on 23rd July when it lost control of the well, which ignited.
News reports say that the rig was preparing the well for production when control was lost. The good news is that the 44 crew members all evacuated by lifeboat and there were no injuries. There was also minimal pollution, overflights only identifying a slight sheen on the water surface which soon dispersed.
By 26th July the well had ceased to flow, probably due to blockage by sediment, and crew members were returned to the rig to evaluate the damage. The operators have hired another jack-up to drill a relief well, one assumes just to be safe, to be safe.
It appears from other photos in the press that the derrick and the cantilever have been completely destroyed, and for the benefit on non oil industry people, this sort of rig is positioned next to a small platform and the derrick moved out over it, and positioned precisely by hydraulic jacks. The BOP is on the surface under the drill floor rather than being on the seabed which is the case for semi-submersibles. This makes jack-ups more vulnerable to blowouts – in my view.
January 2013
Recent Pirate Activity - Pirate activity and the taking of hostages,
The Cormorant Alpha Oil Leak - The Cormorant Alpha oil leak and what happened,
Costa Concordia - The anniversary of the Costa Concordia disaster,
The Kulluk Incident - how it all went wrong,
The Life of Pi - the nautical errors in the popular film.
February 2013
Carnival Cruisers are In It Again - The problems relating to the main engine breakdown of the Carnival Triumph,
A Free Offer - my novel RigMoves (Don’t get your hopes up, not free any more.)
Hallin Penrith - The loss of the Hallin Penrith,
Lyubov Orlova and Friends - Some words about the derelict ship Lyubov Orlova,
The Guardian - The grounding of the USS Guardian in the Philippines.
March 2013
Running Aground in the South Atlantic - The grounding of the Oliva and the arrival of one of its boats in Australia,
Juliette Pride I and Juliette Pride II - The escape of the tugs Juliette Pride I and II,
Accommodation - Offshore ships with no portholes,
The Merchant Shipping Act 1894 - Some thing about the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act,
Island Trader - The Island Trader in the Pacific.
April 2013
Titanic II – Another Shot at Getting it Right - Titanic II, apparently being built in China,
Memories of Mrs Thatcher - Some thing about Mrs Thatcher on the day of her funeral,
Emma Maersk - Fire on the newbuilding Emma Maersk,
The Maersk Detector Collision with the GSF Grand Banks- A DP problem for the Maersk Detector in Canada,
London Gateway - First news about the new port.
May 2013
Greenpeace at Work in Australia - Greenpeace risking lives in Australia,
The Industry Unites - Nautilus takes steps to get the IMO to publish accident investigations,
Maersk EEE - The Maersk Triple E container ships are announced,
The Jolly Nero Accident – a container ship crashes into the coastguard tower in Genoa,
Skandi Foula and the OMS Resolution - The Scandi Foula accident in Aberdeen back in 2010.
June 2013
The Costa Concordia Report - How the rock became embedded in the side of the Costa Concordia,
The Mary Rose Museum - The opening of the Mary Rose museum,
Model Mega Boxship - The Warsash model of a super container ship,
The Jascon 4 - The accident to the Jascon 4 and the recovery of the one survivor.
July 2013
The Noble Paul Romero Event - The sinking of the Noble Paul Romero alongside in Malta,
Incidents on DP Drill Ships - A safety alert about incidents on DP drillships,
Superyacht Accident - A fatal accident on the superyacht Jemsa Hakvoort,
Lifeboats on Offshore Installations - Problems with lifeboats on offshore installations,
The Hercules 265 - A blowout in the jackup Hercules 265.
August 2013
Goodbye Oil Harrier - The Oil Harrier goes to the breakers,
Piracy or Not - An Iranian ship detained in India,
Ramco Crusader - The sinking of the former Seaforth Crusader,
Human Error and Heavy Weather Damage - Some adverse weather problems,
Petrobras and DP - Ships required to use DP by Petrobras.
September 2013
The Costa Concordia is Uprighted - Progress with the removal of the Costa Concordia,
Loss of Two Crew Members in Heavy Weather - The loss of crew members in heavy weather,
Priraziomnaya - Greenpeace invade the Russian Priraziomnaya platform,
Revisiting Macondo - The witness statement for the Deepwater Horizon,
Petrobras and DP – Petrobras and DP again.
October 2013
The Arctic Sunrise Affair - The crew of the Arctic Sunrise are captured by the Russians,
Something from the Costa Concordia Trial - A Moldovan dancer on the Costa Concordia,
Captain Phillips – the film of the Maersk Alabama piracy,
The Neftegas 67 and Yao Hai collision – a description of this distressing event,
The Danny FII report - More about the cattle carrier Danny FII accident.
November 2013
So Goodbye to the Typhoon - The former wonder ship Typhoon sinks out in Nigeria,
The End of the Prestige Business - The former captain of the Prestige receives 9 month suspended sentence,
Wreck Photos - The John Gibson photographic of wrecks off the Scilly Isles,
The Perils of Podded Propulsion - What can go wrong with podded propulsion.
The Danny FII Update - An update on the Danny FII accident.
December 2013
2014 Wishes - Wishes for mariners in 2014,
Stuck in the Frozen South - Ships stuck in the ice now and in years past,
Nickel Ore - The hazards of carrying nickel ore,
Auditing - A discussion about auditing,
The Shipping Forecast - Proposals to discontinue the BBC shipping forecast.